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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
GARY L. LANCASTER, 
District Judge. 
 This case arises under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Plaintiff-appellee, Arnold Orsatti, Jr., alleges that he was arrested without 
probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizure.  Defendant-appellants, New Jersey State Police Officers 
Robert Kirvay and Joseph Guzzardo, appeal from the district court's order denying 
their joint motion for summary judgment. The officers contend that the district 
court erred because they  
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are shielded from Orsatti's claim by the doctrine of qualified immunity.   
 Because we find that the undisputed material facts of record establish that 
it was objectively reasonable for the officers to conclude that they had probable 
cause to arrest Orsatti, we hold that the officers are immune from Orsatti's claim.  
Accordingly, we reverse. 
 
I. 
 The complete factual and procedural background of this case is considerably 
more complex than the court's treatment here. What follows, however, are those 
facts and procedures material to the issue on appeal.  
 In December of 1988, New Jersey State Police began an investigation, named 
"Operation Comserv," into alleged bribery, corruption, and other misconduct by 
Atlantic City, New Jersey public officials.  Officers Kirvay and Guzzardo were in 
charge of the investigation; however, the principal operative was Albert Black, a 
government confidential informant.  The investigation culminated on July 27, 1989, 
with the arrest of eight individuals, including Orsatti.   
 Orsatti and the others were arrested pursuant to criminal complaints and 
warrants issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey.  In the aggregate, these 
criminal complaints alleged a variety of corrupt acts.  However, the complaint 
issued against Orsatti charged him only with official misconduct under N.J. St
Ann. 2C:30-2 and conspiracy to commit official misconduct under N.J. Stat. Ann. 
2C:5-2, and the complaint related only to his role in attempting to acquire for 
Black a gift shop concession contract at the Atlantic City Airport.  At the time of 
his arrest, Orsatti was an Atlantic City Councilman and Chairman of the City 
Council Transportation Committee.   
 Thereafter, a State Grand Jury returned indictments against each of those 
arrested.  The Grand Jury indicted Orsatti for conspiracy to commit racketeering in 
4 
violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:41-2(d) and conspiracy in violation of N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 2C:5-2. The case against all criminal defendants was called to trial on April 
22, 1991.  Following the close of the State's case, the trial judge granted a 
judgment of acquittal to Orsatti and several of the other criminal defendants.  
Eventually, the jury acquitted all of the remaining criminal defendants, save one, 
of the charges.   
 Thereafter, Orsatti filed this civil rights action. Orsatti's complaint is 
broad in scope and asserts claims under both federal and state law.  Moreover, he 
challenges virtually every aspect of his investigation, arrest, and prosecution, 
and he names as defendants essentially every individual involved in Operation 
Comserv.  In this appeal, however, we are only concerned with Orsatti's claim that 
Kirvay and Guzzardo violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
seizures. Specifically, Orsatti alleged that the officers carried out Operation 
Comserv in a negligent and incompetent manner. Orsatti further alleged that the 
officers had neither probable cause to arrest him, nor an objective good faith 
belief that he was guilty of the offense charged. 
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 At the close of discovery, Kirvay and Guzzardo filed a joint motion for 
summary judgment contending that they are entitled to judgment on Orsatti's 
unlawful arrest claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity.  The district court 
denied the motion and held that whether the officers were entitled to immunity 
rested upon disputed questions of fact that the jury had to resolve.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review an order denying 
a claim of immunity raised by a defendant in a motion for summary judgment.  
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 (1985).  The standard of review 
applicable to an order denying summary judgment is plenary, Bixler v. Central Pa. 
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993), and "[o]n 
review, the appellate court is required to apply the same test the district court 
should have utilized initially." Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 
(3d Cir. 1976). 
 Summary judgment may be granted if, drawing all inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).   
 An otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment will not be 
defeated by the mere existence of some factual dispute between the parties.  
However, a dispute over those facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under 
the governing substantive law, i.e., the material facts, will preclude the entry of 
summary judgment.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  
Similarly, summary judgment is improper so long as the dispute over the material 
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facts is genuine.  In determining whether the dispute is genuine, the court's 
function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but 
only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  Id.  
 
III. 
   A.   
 Kirvay and Guzzardo argue that the district court erred in denying their 
joint motion for summary judgment.  They contend that they are immune from 
Orsatti's suit because the undisputed material facts of record establish that they 
were objectively reasonable in concluding that probable cause existed to arrest 
Orsatti for the crime of official misconduct.  We agree. 
 The general principles of law that govern this case are well settled.  
Broadly stated, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from arresting a 
citizen except upon probable cause.  Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 
156, 169 (1972).  Probable cause to arrest requires more than mere suspicion; 
however, it does not require that the officer have evidence sufficient to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1205 
(3d Cir. 1984). Rather, probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and 
circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves 
to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being 
committed by the person to be arrested.  United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 
(3d Cir. 1990) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9 (1979)).  When a 
police officer does arrest a person without probable cause, the officer may be 
liable in a civil rights suit for damages.  Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
 Nevertheless, "government officials performing discretionary functions, 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
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does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known."  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982).  Government officials, such as police officers, are accorded qualified 
rather than absolute immunity in order to accommodate two important interests:  the 
officials' interest in performing their duties without the fear of constantly 
defending themselves against insubstantial claims for damages, and the public's 
interest in recovering damages when government officials unreasonably invade or 
violate individual rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).  
 Because the qualified immunity doctrine provides the official with immunity 
from suit, not simply trial, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & 
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993), the district court should resolve any immunity 
question at the earliest possible stage of the litigation.  Creighton, 483 U.S. at 
646 n.6.  When the material facts are not in dispute, the district court may decide 
whether a government official is shielded by qualified immunity as a matter of law.  
Id. 
 Typically, the dispositive issue in these types of cases is whether the right 
at issue was "clearly established" at the time the official acted.  In this case, 
however, there is no question that the right at issue, namely, the right to be free 
from arrest except on probable cause, was clearly established at the time of 
Orsatti's arrest.  Finding that the right at issue was clearly established, 
however, does not end the court's inquiry.  Nor does the court's decision turn 
merely on whether the official violated that clearly established right.  On the 
contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized that it is inevitable that law 
enforcement officers will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that 
probable cause to make an arrest is present.  The Court has made clear that in such 
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cases those officers, like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe 
to be lawful, will not be held personally liable.  Id. at 641. 
 In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), the Supreme Court, in a damage 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, established the degree of immunity to be accorded a 
police officer who arrests a citizen after presenting a judge with a complaint and 
supporting affidavit that allegedly fails to establish probable cause.  The Court 
held that whether a police officer is immune is governed by the same standard of 
objective reasonableness that applies in the context of a suppression hearing under 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  Under this standard, only where the 
warrant application is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence unreasonable," will the officer lose the shield of 
immunity. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.  The Court further held that the standard for 
determining the reasonableness of an official's belief in the existence of probable 
cause is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that his 
affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have 
applied for the warrant under the conditions.  Id. at 345. 
 According to this standard, the qualified immunity doctrine "gives ample room 
for mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law." Id.   
 
B. 
 In this case, the district court held that Kirvay and Guzzardo were not 
entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense for two distinct 
reasons.  First, the district court found that summary judgment was improper 
"because the plaintiff's allegations suffice to allege conduct that violated the 
clearly established constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable 
cause . . ."  Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, No. 91-3023, slip op. at 51 
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(D.N.J. Nov. 2, 1994). Of course, the district court would have been correct had 
the matter been before the court on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(6).  The matter before the district court, however, was a motion for summary 
judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Summary judgment is designed to go beyond the 
pleadings in order to assess whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and 
whether a trial is necessary. 
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 Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot resist a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment merely by restating the allegations of his complaint, but must 
point to concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essent
element of his case.  Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  Therefore, the 
mere fact that Orsatti's allegations, if true, state a claim is an insufficient 
basis for the district court to deny the officers' motion for summary judgment. 
 Second, the district court found that there remained an issue of material 
fact regarding whether the officers conducted Operation Comserv negligently.  In 
support of its finding, the district court relied on the expert report of Richard 
Kobetz, Doctor of Public Administration.  Dr. Kobetz opined that the state police 
conducted Operation Comserv in a reckless and grossly negligent manner because:  
(1) they did not conduct a focused investigation; (2) they did not train Mr. Black 
to properly operate the wireless transmitter they supplied him with; (3) they did 
not instruct Mr. Black to properly utilize equipment they had supplied him with; 
and (4) they did not supervise his criminal investigatory procedures and strategy, 
nor his handling of money, expenditures, and equipment.  The district court held 
that this evidence precluded summary judgment because, in the court's view, if 
Orsatti were to succeed at proving that the officers carried out Operation Comserv 
in a negligent manner, he might convince the jury that no reasonable person in the 
police officers' shoes could have reasonably believed that the criminal prosecution 
was lawful.  Orsatti, No. 91-3023, slip op. at 52. The district court's reasoning, 
however, was flawed. 
 The obligation of local law enforcement officers is to conduct criminal 
investigations in a manner that does not violate the constitutionally protected 
rights of the person under investigation.  Therefore, whether the officers 
conducted the investigation negligently is not a material fact.  Indeed, for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the issue is not whether the information on which police 
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officers base their request for an arrest warrant resulted from a professionally 
executed investigation; rather, the issue is whether that information would warrant 
a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by 
the person to be arrested.   
 Therefore, in order to assess whether Guzzardo and Kirvay are entitled to 
immunity on Orsatti's Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim, the district court 
should have focused on the information the officers had available to them, not on 
whether the information resulted from exemplary police work.  Upon our review of 
that information, we find that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to 
conclude that they had sufficient information to believe that Orsatti had committed 
the crime of official misconduct. 
 
C. 
 In support of our conclusion that the officers were objectively reasonable in 
believing they had probable cause to arrest Orsatti for official misconduct, we 
turn to the elements of that offense.2  Under N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-2, Orsatti may 
be found guilty of official misconduct if, (1) he was a public servant at the time 
alleged in the complaint, (2) he committed an act relating to his office knowing 
the act was unauthorized, or he committed the act in an unauthorized manner, and 
(3) his purpose was to benefit himself or another.  State of New Jersey v. Vickery
646 A.2d 1159, 1160 (N.J. Super. Court Law Div. 1994).  The statute does not 
require that the public official's "act" constitute a criminal act, only that it 
                     
2
      For reasons that are unclear, Orsatti focused his 
appellate arguments on the elements of conspiracy to commit 
racketeering under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d), which is the subject of 
his state common law malicious prosecution claim.  However, 
Orsatti's malicious prosecution claim is not the subject of this 
appeal.  Appellants have appealed only the district court's order 
rejecting their qualified immunity defense on the Fourth 
Amendment unlawful arrest claim. 
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embody an unauthorized exercise of his official functions.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30
2(a). 
 The information that the officers relied on to support their conclusion that 
probable cause existed to arrest Orsatti for official misconduct was gathered from 
taped conversations secretly recorded by Black, the government's confidential 
informant.  A synopsis of the taped conversations was later placed in Kirvay's 
affidavit of probable cause and was presented to the New Jersey Superior Court 
judge in support of the request for the criminal complaint and warrant for 
Orsatti's arrest.   
 Specifically, on July 16, 1989, Black recorded a conversation between 
himself, Jack Wolf, a public relations agent for Pan Am World Services, Inc., and 
Orsatti.  The conversation took place at Cousin's Country Inn in Egg Harbor 
Township, New Jersey.  The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Black's proposal 
to acquire a gift shop concession at the Atlantic City Airport.  Although the 
record is unclear, apparently Stephen Williams, an airport official, had authority 
to decide who, if anyone, would get the concession.   
 According to the tape, at the meeting Wolf, Orsatti, and Black devised a plan 
whereby Wolf would compose fraudulent letters.  These fraudulent letters would 
purport to be from various citizens complaining of the lack of a gift shop at the 
airport and stressing the need for one.  Black, in turn, would have the letters 
rewritten in different handwriting styles and then give the fraudulent letters to 
Orsatti.  Orsatti, in his capacity as an Atlantic City Councilman and Chairman of 
the City Council Transportation Committee, would then present the letters to 
Williams to pressure Williams into awarding the gift shop contract to Black. 
 On July 18, 1989, Black recorded a second conversation with Wolf.  According 
to the tape, Wolf gave the fraudulent letters to Black and instructed Black to 
deliver them to Orsatti later that day.  As Wolf instructed, Black met with Orsatti 
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in Atlantic City and again recorded their conversation.  According to the tape, 
Black gave the fraudulent letters to Orsatti, and Orsatti indicated that he would 
give the letters to Williams at a meeting they had scheduled for the following day.
 On July 19, 1989, New Jersey State Police detectives conducted a physical 
surveillance at the Atlantic City Airport and, at approximately 12:50 p.m., saw 
Orsatti meet with Williams. Two days later, Black called Orsatti and again recorded 
the conversation.  According to the tape, when the conversation turned to Orsatti's 
July 19 meeting with Williams, the following exchange took place: 
Black: At your news conference.  How did things go? 
Orsatti: Good. 
Black: These letters work all right? 
Orsatti: What? 
Black: The letters work all right? 
Orsatti: Yea, yea. 
Black: Did you talk to our friend Williams and all? 
Orsatti: He said we're having a gift shop. 
Black: That's great, that's great.   
 Orsatti does not contend that the officers tampered with, changed, or altered 
the tapes in any way, nor does Orsatti contend that the officers misrepresented the 
text of the taped conversations in the affidavit of probable cause presented to the 
New Jersey Superior Court judge.  Orsatti does, however, point out that Williams, 
in his Grand Jury testimony, denied speaking with Orsatti about the gift shop 
matter and also denied receiving the fraudulent letters from Orsatti.  Although 
disconcerting, this fact is not material, because we must determine whether an 
arrest was objectively reasonable on the basis of the information the officers had 
available at the time of arrest, not thereafter.  
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 In summary, the undisputed facts of record establish that at the time of 
Orsatti's arrest, the officers had tape recordings that indicated that Orsatti 
participated in formulating a scheme to acquire the airport gift shop concession 
for Black's benefit, in part by fraudulent means, i.e., forged letters from 
nonexistent citizens.  According to the tapes, Orsatti received the fraudulent 
letters, and he agreed to deliver those letters to Williams, the airport official.  
At the time, Orsatti was acting in his capacity as an Atlantic City Councilman.  
Orsatti was observed speaking with Williams at the appointed time and place, and 
Orsatti expressly reassured Black that the letters were effective.   
 Under these undisputed material facts, we are satisfied that no rational jury 
could find that the officers were objectively unreasonable in concluding that, 
based on the information available to them at the time, they had probable cause to 
believe that Orsatti's conduct constituted the crime of official misconduct.  
Kirvay and Guzzardo are, therefore, immune from this claim. 
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons we reverse the district court's order of Nove
2, 1994, insofar as it denied defendant-appellants Kirvay's and Guzzardo's joint 
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff-appellee Orsatti's section 1983 claim for 
arrest without probable cause. 
              
